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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of deep integration in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on 
multinational production (MP), i.e. the production carried out by firms outside of their country of origin. 
Using a structural gravity model, we find that tariff reductions have a positive impact on MP of goods. 
This effect is stronger for foreign affiliates trading intermediate inputs or serving the final demand. 
However, while deep provisions have no significant impact on foreign affiliates that produce goods, we 
find that deep integration provisions positively affects foreign affiliates operating in the service sector. 
These results suggest that the proliferation of PTAs with deep integration provisions has contributed to 
the growth of multinational production and facilitated the participation of foreign affiliates in global 
value chains. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction* 
Multinational production (MP) is the production carried out by firms outside of their country of origin 
(Ramondo, et al., 2015). It involves foreign direct investment (FDI) as firms need to establish affiliates 
(or in some cases branches) in order to produce abroad. But MP is part of a global strategy where 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) decide from which countries they source inputs, in which countries 
they produce and which markets they serve (Bernard et al., 2018). As such, preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) that are ‘deep’ and cover not only trade liberalisation for goods but also services, investment, 
competition, intellectual property and a variety of other regulatory issues that can influence firms’ 
decisions are expected to have an impact on MP. As described by Baldwin (2011), 21st century 
regionalism is less about tariff preferences and more about addressing the trade-investment-service 
nexus. 
Using a new dataset on activities of foreign affiliates, this paper studies for the first time the impact 
of PTAs on MP for a large set of developed and emerging economies. We investigate the extent to which 
deep provisions that go beyond tariff reductions affect foreign affiliate production in the manufacturing 
and service sectors. Additionally, we use a value-added approach to better understand the implications 
of PTAs on foreign affiliates’ sourcing strategies in the context of global value chains. 
The impact of deep provisions1 on trade has been studied in a series of papers (World Trade 
Organization, 2011; Mattoo, et al., 2017; Dhingra, et al., 2018; Lee, 2018). However, this literature has 
not yet explored the impact on MP, due to data limitations (namely, the lack of data on the activity of 
foreign affiliates). Some papers have looked at the impact of deep trade agreements on global value 
chains (Orefice and Rocha, 2014) but rather focusing on trade flows related to international production 
networks and not on production by foreign-owned firms. More related to the question of multinational 
production are the two papers by Osnago et al. (2015; 2017) that investigate the relationship between 
deep trade agreements and vertical FDI. The authors find a positive relationship between the depth of 
PTAs and the offshoring of the supply of inputs. They also study the impact of specific provisions on 
the choice between outsourcing (trade) and vertical FDI (investment). But only one aspect of 
multinational production (vertical FDI) is studied. 
This paper extends the existing literature by investigating the impact of PTAs on MP, while 
distinguishing between foreign affiliate activity in the manufacturing and service sectors. This analysis 
contributes to the literature in three respects. First, using a structural gravity model, we find that tariff 
reductions have a positive impact on MP of goods. In particular, the effect of tariff liberalisation is 
stronger for those foreign affiliates trading intermediate inputs or serving the final demand. Second, 
deep provisions do not affect foreign affiliates that produce goods. This finding is not surprising since 
trade and investment are in a complex relationship, sometimes acting as substitutes and sometimes being 
complements. Third, we find that deep integration positively affects foreign affiliates operating in the 
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is especially grateful to Richard Baldwin and Céline Carrère for their constant advice and support. We are also grateful 
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1 The concept of ‘deep integration’ applied to regionalism and PTAs comes from Lawrence (1996). The North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that entered into force in 1994 was the first PTA combining the traditional tariff 
preferences found in trade agreements with provisions on services, investment, competition and intellectual property. It 
opened the door to a new wave of PTAs with deep integration provisions negotiated by all major economies. Agreements 
that are not ‘deep’ are defined as ‘shallow’, meaning that they only cover tariff preferences and not the behind-the-border 
barriers and regulatory issues found in deep integration agreements.  
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service sector. This evidence is consistent with the proliferation of PTAs including provisions 
liberalising trade in services through commercial presence. 
The impact of PTAs on MP depends on the trade-off between exports and FDI. This relationship is 
not straightforward and has been long discussed in the literature. Theories of MNEs traditionally 
distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI2. Horizontal FDI is motivated by the desire to place 
production close to customers and to avoid trade costs. When there is horizontal FDI, we expect tariff 
reductions to have a positive effect on the intensive margin of MP and a mixed effect on the extensive 
margin. The former channel is explained by Kleinert and Toubal (2010). Trade costs affect negatively 
the volume of each affiliate’s sales when production requires intermediates, which must be imported at 
a high cost from the home country. Instead, the effect on the firm decision to serve a foreign market 
through trade or FDI is ambiguous. On the one hand, when trade costs becomes smaller than all costs 
associated with FDI, the multinational will decide to trade rather than setting up a foreign affiliate 
(Brainard, 1997; Helpman et al., 2004). However, deep provisions (services, investment, competition, 
etc.) might have a positive impact on the extensive margin of MP by lowering the set-up costs associated 
with FDI. 
When firms establish an affiliate to supply inputs or access resources as part of their global sourcing 
strategy (vertical FDI), trade and investment are in a complementary relationship (Helpman, 1984; 
Antràs and Helpman, 2004). We expect tariff liberalisation to have a positive effect on MP, particularly 
through the channel of reduced costs to move inputs and processed goods across countries. Moreover, 
deep provisions in PTAs may increase or decrease vertical FDI, depending on whether they improve the 
contractibility of inputs provided by the headquarters (partner countries) or by the suppliers (Antràs and 
Helpman, 2008). 
By lowering trade costs between parties, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are therefore expected 
to have an impact on multinational production, creating new opportunities for vertical FDI or reducing 
the incentives for horizontal FDI. Trade diversion and creation effects, as identified in the literature on 
the economic impact of PTAs (Viner, 1950) can also become FDI creation and diversion effects (either 
in the same direction or in the opposite direction, depending on the prevalence of complementary and 
substitution effects between trade and investment). 
In addition, while deep provisions in PTAs are generally expected to increase trade between parties 
of the PTA, trade agreements increasingly include investment provisions (Miroudot and Lesher, 2007; 
Kotschwar, 2009; Chornyi et al., 2016). When agreements cover trade in services and follow the model 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), they generally have disciplines on trade through 
commercial presence (mode 3) which is MP through a foreign affiliate in services industries. In addition, 
comprehensive trade agreements have investment chapters that extend to goods the disciplines covered 
in services chapters and add investment protection provisions both for goods and services. Such 
provisions are also expected to have an impact on investment decisions by firms, particularly when their 
enforcement is warranted by specific mechanisms such as an investor-state dispute settlement. 
Beyond the core trade and investment provisions, other provisions of trade agreements may have an 
impact on MP. In the context of offshoring and global value chains, the nature of the problem that a 
trade agreement must solve is different and involves a wider set of policies going beyond market access 
(Antràs and Staiger, 2012). Some of these provisions are aimed at improving the business environment, 
facilitating the operations of firms, providing guarantees against different types of policy risks or policy 
reversals, as well as organising some co-operation between governments to harmonise rules or mitigate 
the impact of regulatory differences. All these provisions may also influence firm strategies and 
therefore MP. 
                                                     
2 However, the reality of MNEs has become more complex than this horizontal – vertical dichotomy: most MNEs are 
engaged both in horizontal and vertical investments abroad (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009) and most MNE affiliates have both 
horizontal and vertical characteristics (Herger and McCorriston, 2013; Ray, 2016). 
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This paper looks at the impact of deep trade agreements on MP, taking advantage of a new dataset 
developed at the OECD, the analytical AMNE database (Cadestin et al., 2018a). In this dataset, MP is 
measured by the output of foreign-owned firms, with data harmonised across countries and made 
consistent with national accounts. The dataset covers the period 2000-2014 and builds on the OECD 
Activities of Multinational Enterprises (AMNE) statistics and the World Input-Output Database 
(Timmer et al., 2015). In addition to providing data on the output of foreign affiliates, the dataset 
includes global input-output tables that have been split according to ownership, distinguishing the 
contribution to trade and output of domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms. With such data, we can 
introduce a value-added analysis of the output of foreign affiliates (Andrenelli et al., 2018) and 
distinguish within the production of these affiliates the value-added derived from manufacturing or 
services inputs. It allows us to test more specifically the impact of deep integration provisions on goods 
or services and the role of services in MP of manufacturing firms and vice-versa.  
In order to capture the deep provisions found in PTAs, the analysis relies on the Design of Trade 
Agreements Database (DESTA) as described in Dür, Baccini and Elsig (2014). The dataset has 
information on more than 620 agreements and covers all PTAs in force in our period of interest. It 
includes not only a broad set of provision categories but it distinguishes between substantive provisions 
and shallow provisions. The database also has information on some aspects of PTA enforcement, such 
as dispute mechanisms. 
The paper is organized as follows. The empirical strategy is described in Section 2 and the data in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of the econometric analysis, together with some robustness 
checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Empirical strategy 
2.1 Theoretical framework 
Although the gravity model was developed to study trade in goods and has only recently been applied 
to trade in services (Kimura and Lee, 2006; Anderson, Milot and Yotov, 2014) and FDI (Bénassy-Quéré, 
Coupet and Mayer, 2007; Kleinert and Toubal, 2010; Anderson, Larch and Yotov, 2017), recent 
literature has extended its range of applications to MP (Alviarez, 2014; Ramondo, Rodríguez-Clare and 
Tintelnot, 2015). Our empirical model is based on the standard structural gravity framework. We define 
MP of a parent country j controlling foreign affiliates in destination country i as 
𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝐺 𝑆𝑖 𝑀𝑗 𝑡𝑖𝑗 ;           (1) 
where 𝐺 is a ‘gravitational constant’, 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑀𝑗 captures host and partner country’s characteristics, 
respectively, and 𝑡𝑖𝑗 denotes bilateral frictions (investment and trade costs) between partner and host 
country.  
Kleinert and Toubal (2010) show that benchmark models of multinational firms yield gravity 
equations of the form in Equation 1. For instance, a model of monopolistic competition with 
heterogeneous firms (as in Helpman et al., 2004) generates a similar gravity equation. This model also 
assumes heterogeneous fixed costs, since fixed costs increase with distance by the fact that distance 
increases upfront search costs and organization costs. This model predicts that in equilibrium only the 
most productive firms become multinationals and that their entry decreases with distance. In a panel 
framework, the log-linear of the MP gravity equation is 
ln 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ln 𝐺 + ln 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + ln 𝑀𝑗𝑡 + ln 𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡.       (2) 
Following the empirical trade gravity literature (Yotov and Piermartini, 2017), we control for 
potential omitted variables through partner-time and host-country-time fixed effects (𝛿𝑗𝑡 and 𝜓𝑖𝑡, 
respectively). These country-time fixed effects control for country-specific time-varying factors that 
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may influence MP, such as output, price levels and multilateral resistances (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003). Moreover, country-pair fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖𝑗, address the issue of endogeneity of trade policy 
variables (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), while controlling for time-invariant country-pair observable 
characteristics (such as geographical distance, cultural and linguistic proximity), as well as unobservable 
bilateral factors that may influence MP between the two countries. Finally, we can decompose bilateral 
frictions as follows: 𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗, where 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 is equal to one when countries j and i have a trade 
agreement in place at time t. As a result, our gravity model of MP is:  
ln 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑗𝑡 +  𝜓𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗.       (3) 
2.2 Empirical specification 
To investigate the role of deep provisions in affecting MP beyond tariff reductions, we estimate the 
following reduced-form specification on a panel dataset covering the years 2000 to 2014: 
𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = exp(𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑗 + 𝜓𝑖𝑡 + 𝜎𝑗𝑡)  +  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡;   (4) 
where 𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  denotes MP of goods or services in country i controlled by a parent company in country j 
at time t. We estimate this specification for several categories of MP: first, gross output which is further 
disaggregated between gross exports and domestic sales, as well as between intermediate and final sales; 
second, gross output is decomposed in foreign value added (FVA) and domestic value added (DVA) in 
gross exports and domestic sales. 𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 is 1 if countries i and j have a free trade agreement or customs 
union in place at time t. 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a vector of dummy variables, each equal to 1 if the trade 
agreement between country i and j has a specific provision category in place at time t. The coefficient 
of each provision category is equivalent to an interaction variable with the PTA variable since there are 
no observations where a country-pair has a provision without having a PTA. In addition, with the 
inclusion of country-pair fixed effects, the identifying variation in this regression is provided by the 
entry into force of a new PTA or the addition of a new provision category into pre-existing PTAs. This 
would be the case when a country pair already has a PTA in goods and later becomes part of another 
PTA (perhaps with different members involved), or when a country pair signs a PTA for goods and 
services but the date of entry into force is different for the two (Lee, 2018). 
Following the gravity literature, to allow for adjustments in MP in response to changes in trade 
agreements, we use 2-year intervals instead of estimating the specification using annual data.3 We 
estimate our gravity specification using both the ordinary least squares (OLS) and the Poisson Pseudo 
Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The PPML estimator 
has the advantage of accounting for potential heteroscedasticity in foreign affiliate activity and to deal 
with sample selection, since it keeps zero observations by allowing to include the dependent variable in 
level.4 In all estimations, the standard errors are clustered by country pairs. 
3. Data 
3.1 Foreign affiliate activity 
The variables for multinational production are taken from the OECD analytical AMNE database.5 In 
this dataset, multinational production is measured by the output of foreign-owned firms, with data 
harmonised across countries and made consistent with national accounts. The dataset covers the period 
                                                     
3 Contrary to the literature which uses 3-,4- or 5-year intervals, we use 2-year intervals given our shorter panel. Results for 
4-year intervals are available in the Appendix. 
4 The zero observations make up for around 5 per cent of the sample. 
5 http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/analytical-amne-database.htm  
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2000-2014 and builds on the OECD Activities of Multinational Enterprises (AMNE) statistics and the 
World Input-Output Database (Timmer et al., 2015). In addition to providing data on the output of 
foreign affiliates, the dataset includes global input-output tables that have been split according to 
ownership, distinguishing the contribution to trade and output of domestic-owned and foreign-owned 
firms.6 This novel global database of foreign affiliate (FA) production covers 43 host and partner 
countries and 43 sectors (including primary, manufacturing and services). In other words, each 
observation in the database provides information on the gross output of foreign affiliates in a host 
country i controlled by a partner country j. Several alternative projects have assembled similar bilateral 
datasets on MNE production (Fukui and Lakatos, 2012; Alviarez, 2014; Ramondo et al., 2015; Federico, 
2016), but not at the same level of disaggregation of countries and industries. 
Gross measures of the output of foreign affiliates include the value-added of the firms exporting or 
producing locally as well as the use of intermediate inputs. These intermediates generate some double 
counting when aggregating data across industries or countries, since the same intermediate input can be 
counted several times. Inter-country input-output tables allow for the tracking of value-added across 
sectors and countries and for the removal of this double counting. This is especially a concern for the 
output of foreign affiliates because double counting is prevalent (Andrenelli et al., 2018). We thus 
decompose foreign affiliate gross output into its domestic (DVA) and foreign value added (FVA) 
components, allowing to determine the value added which is created domestically as opposed to the 
value-added sourced from other countries. The decomposition follows the methodology developed by 
Miroudot and Ye (2018). 
Since 2000, FA activity has been rapidly increasing, reaching almost 20 trillion US$ in 2014.7 Table 
1 disaggregates the type of MP into output sold domestically and output exported. In the manufacturing 
sector, export motives are important and increasing over time, making up 43 per cent of foreign affiliate 
production in 2014. Conversely, in the services sector, the lion’s share of MP activity is dedicated to 
serving domestic markets, with domestic activity accounting for more than 80 per cent of multinational 
production. 
Table 1. Share of type of activity in total MP, 2000-2014 
 
Note: FA dom int indicates foreign affiliate production of intermediates sold domestically; FA dom final foreign 
affiliate production of finals sold domestically; FA exp int foreign affiliate export of intermediates; and, FA exp 
final foreign affiliate export of finals. 
3.2 The Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database 
Our source of information on trade agreements and their provisions is the Design of Trade Agreements 
(DESTA) database by Dür, Baccini and Elsig (2014).8 This dataset builds on the list of agreements 
notified to the WTO, providing the widest coverage of trade agreements available. The major 
assumption in the construction of the data is that when there is more than one bilateral trade agreement 
in place, we add up the provisions included in each agreement based on the lex specialis derogat legi 
generali. This doctrine states that if two laws govern the same factual situation, a law governing a 
                                                     
6 For further details on the construction of the analytical AMNE database, see Cadestin et al. (2018a). 
7 For more information on MP patterns across time, regions and industries, see Cadestin et al. (2018b). 
8 Our variables enter the model at the date of entry into force of an agreement, instead at the date of signature. 
GOODS 2000 2005 2010 2014 SERVICES 2000 2005 2010 2014
FA dom int 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.35 FA dom int 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.47
FA dom final 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.17 FA dom final 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.35
FA exp int 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.27 FA exp int 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12
FA exp final 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.21 FA exp final 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
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specific subject matter (lex specialis) overrides a law governing only general matters (lex generalis). 
This implies that a bilateral agreement with a substantive provision on services overrules an agreement 
without any commitment on services. 
Table 2 shows the share of each provision category across all country pairs in our dataset. Overall, 
there has been a rapid increase in economic integration in the 2000-2014 period. In 2014, 61 per cent of 
the country pairs in the dataset have either a partial scope agreement, free trade agreement, or customs 
union in place (i.e. PTA). In addition, 51 per cent of country pairs have a trade agreement including a 
substantive provision on trade in services (Serv prov); 48 per cent a competition chapter (Comp prov) 
and 48 per cent an investment chapter (Inv prov). Finally, 50 per cent of the country pairs have a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT)9 in place in 2014. 
However, as shown in Table 3, provisions on services, investment and competition are highly 
collinear among themselves. To avoid any problem of multicollinearity, we group services, investment, 
and competition provisions into a deep integration variable or we include each provision as a stand-
alone category in the specification (as in Dhingra et al., 2018). 
Table 2. Share of each provision category in the bilateral dataset, 2000-2014 
  
Note: Serv prov denotes trade agreements including a substantive provision stipulating the liberalisation of trade 
in services; Comp prov including a competition chapter; and, Inv prov including an investment chapter within or 
beyond a services chapter. The other provision categories identify trade agreements containing concrete provisions 
on public procurement (Proc prov), a chapter or a provision on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS prov) 
and technical barriers to trade (TBT prov). Finally, IPR prov denotes a trade agreement including a substantive 
provision on protecting intellectual property rights and BIT stays for bilateral investment treaties. 
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix for PTA provisions, 2000-2014  
 
                                                     
9 Data on bilateral investment treaties come from the World Trade Institute.  
2000 2005 2010 2014
PTA 0.51 0.57 0.58 0.61
Serv prov 0.34 0.45 0.47 0.51
Inv prov 0.15 0.34 0.41 0.48
Comp prov 0.33 0.39 0.41 0.48
Proc prov 0.28 0.45 0.47 0.50
SPS prov 0.47 0.53 0.55 0.59
TBT prov 0.45 0.53 0.55 0.59
IPR prov 0.16 0.38 0.44 0.51
BIT 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.50
PTA Serv prov Inv prov Comp prov Proc prov SPS prov TBT prov IPR prov
PTA 1.00
Serv prov 0.77 1.00
Inv prov 0.63 0.80 1.00
Comp prov 0.71 0.91 0.88 1.00
Proc prov 0.75 0.86 0.71 0.77 1.00
SPS prov 0.93 0.83 0.67 0.76 0.80 1.00
TBT prov 0.93 0.83 0.67 0.76 0.80 0.98 1.00
IPR prov 0.67 0.75 0.83 0.72 0.75 0.72 0.72 1.00
Preferential Trade Agreements and Multinational Production 
European University Institute 7 
4. Results of the econometric analysis 
4.1 Deep integration and MP of goods 
We first look at the relationship between deep integration in PTAs and MP for goods, i.e. the impact of 
PTA provisions on the output of foreign affiliates in manufacturing industries. The main results are 
shown in Table 4, with a comparison between shallow integration (the impact of the PTA variable) and 
deep integration (the impact of services, investment and competition provisions, as well as other types 
of provisions going beyond trade liberalisation). 
The econometric analysis starts with an OLS estimation of the gravity model with two-year interval 
data.10 The empirical specification includes traditional gravity variables, such as distance, common 
language, contiguity and colonial ties. Two main findings of the OLS estimates reported in column (1) 
of Table 4 stand out. First, the estimates of the effects of the standard gravity variables indicate that 
higher trade costs negatively affect multinational production. This is consistent with a complementary 
relationship between trade and investment where for example FA activity requires importing 
intermediates from the home country or the output of affiliates is exported back. In this case, higher 
trade costs discourage fragmentation and affiliates’ production. Second, the results suggest that PTAs 
play a negative role in promoting MP. One possible explanation is that this specification does not 
account properly for the potential endogeneity of PTAs. 
To control for potential heteroscedasticity in MP data, column (2) estimates the same gravity 
specification with the PPML estimator. The estimates become non-significant, reinforcing the previous 
interpretation. To address the potential endogeneity of PTAs, we follow the gravity literature (Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2007) by including country-pair fixed effects. The PPML estimation results with pair fixed 
effects are reported in column (3). The coefficient of the PTA variable is statistically significant and 
positive and suggests that PTAs increase MP between parties by about 21 per cent11.  
Moreover, while BITs are expected to be a positive determinant of FDI, the coefficient of the BIT 
dummy is not significant. This is consistent with Osnago et al. (2015) who find BITs to be not significant 
in driving vertical FDI, as well as Baker (2012) who reports that BITs did not attract FDI after the mid-
1990s. Moreover, BITs may influence more the volume of FDI than the activities of affiliates once 
established (i.e. multinational production). There is no good correlation between FDI (flows or stocks) 
and the sales of foreign affiliates (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010). We expect PTAs to have more impact on 
the operations of firms (after their establishment) due to provisions affecting the supply of inputs and 
domestic sales. 
However, while country-pair fixed effects allow to control for potential omitted variable bias, the 
specification in column (3) does not properly account for possible ‘reverse causality’ between MP and 
PTAs. This issue arises because countries’ participation in PTAs is not random. The more two countries 
are economically integrated, the greater the incentives to deepen their bilateral/regional agreements. 
Following Wooldridge (2010) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007), we add a new variable capturing the 
future level of PTAs, PTA(t+2), to the specification in column (3) in order to assess the ‘strict 
exogeneity’ of PTAs. In column (4), the coefficient of the lead PTA variable is not significant, 
confirming that PTAs are exogenous to multinational production. 
Column (5) addresses the possibility that the effects of PTAs change over time. As suggested in Baier 
and Bergstrand (2007), the entire economic effect of PTAs on trade cannot be fully captured in the 
current year. In Table 4, the estimated coefficient of the lagged PTA variable is not significant, 
suggesting that there is no phasing-in effect of PTA on MP of goods. 
                                                     
10 The results for 4-year intervals are in the Appendix. 
11 The coefficients (𝛽) in the PPML regressions are interpreted as (𝑒𝛽−1) percent change in multinational production.  
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Column (6) shows the interaction between the PTA and EU dummy to test whether the relationship 
is different for EU countries. The coefficient of the EU dummy is not significant, indicating that the 
PTA average effect on MP does not differ between intra-EU and extra-EU MP. We believe EU 
enlargement agreements to be different from other PTAs for two reasons. First, these agreements create 
free movement of capital and people and are not comparable with the provisions found in traditional 
PTAs signed between countries that offer preferential treatment but have no intention to fully integrate 
their markets. Second, enlargement agreements set up a progressive liberalisation based on how ready 
the country is to join the EU. As a result, they are anticipated by Stabilisation and Accession agreements 
years before the official accession, already reducing the uncertainty affecting MNE decisions. 
The results for the PTA variable with additional robustness checks indicate that having a PTA 
(shallow integration) has a positive impact on MP of goods. To test the impact of deep components of 
trade agreements, we then include all the dummy variables accounting for agreements including 
services, competition, investment, procurement and intellectual property rights provisions. Column (7) 
in Table 4 shows that the coefficients of these dummies are not significant. Since the specification 
controls for the existence of a PTA, it means that for FA output in manufacturing industries, the deep 
provisions do not lead to an additional positive impact on MP.  
Table 4. PTAs effects on MP of goods 
 
Note: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014, and 
use partner-time and host-time fixed effects. Column (1) applies the OLS estimator and column (2) uses the 
PPML estimator. Column (3) adds country-pair fixed effects. Column (4) introduces PTA lead. Column (5) 
allows for phasing-in effects of PTAs. Column (6) accounts for the effect of deep provisions. Finally, column (7) 
includes an interaction between deep agreements and a dummy for EU Member countries. Standard errors are 
clustered by country-pair and are reported in parentheses. The p-values read as follow: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS PPML ENDG LEAD PHSNG EU DEEP
VARIABLES FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output
Contiguity 0.910*** 0.0864
(0.163) (0.0606)
Common language 0.231* 0.400***
(0.137) (0.0662)
Log distance -0.852*** -0.533***
(0.0645) (0.0416)
Colony 0.414** 0.206***
(0.170) (0.0586)
PTA -0.185* -0.0555 0.190** 0.168* 0.195** 0.189** 0.185**
(0.0963) (0.0955) (0.0942) (0.0888) (0.0898) (0.0945) (0.0826)
BIT -0.0253 0.183** -0.163 -0.163 -0.163 -0.163 -0.164
(0.0717) (0.0714) (0.118) (0.116) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117)
PTA(t+2) 0.0575
(0.0556)
PTA(t-2) -0.00972
(0.0574)
PTA*EU 0.239
(0.345)
Srv&Cmp&Inv -0.0252
(0.0970)
Proc prov 0.126
(0.113)
IPR prov -0.0522
(0.0858)
Observations 12,108 13,120 13,112 13,112 13,112 13,112 13,112
R-squared 0.804 0.839 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982
Host-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Partner-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-pair FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
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4.2 Mechanisms at work 
The results from Table 4 suggest that FA activity in the manufacturing sector benefits from tariff 
liberalisation but not from provisions on services, competition and investment, i.e. that shallow 
integration has an impact rather than deep integration. One explanation could be that what is 
characterised as ‘shallow integration’ has perhaps more to offer to companies in the manufacturing 
sector than deep integration provisions. Tariff provisions reduce trade costs through the abolition of 
tariffs or preferential rates on the manufacturing inputs that are used by foreign affiliates producing 
goods. Conversely, the services provisions are legal commitments that may not actually liberalise trade. 
In the trade literature, these provisions are nonetheless found to have a positive impact by reducing the 
policy uncertainty for exporters (Lamprecht and Miroudot, 2018). But the impact could be lower than 
the tariff reductions. Moreover, the impact of PTAs may be different when foreign affiliates rely on 
imported intermediates to serve foreign demand (i.e. market-seeking MP) or when multinationals 
fragment their production processes internationally (efficiency-seeking MP). We test for these 
hypotheses in two ways: first, we decompose FA production in intermediates versus final goods and 
domestically sold versus exported output; second, we look at the effect of PTAs on value-added 
measures of MP. 
Looking at Table 5, the first important finding is that shallow PTAs increase MP of goods for the 
foreign affiliates that serve the final demand, either by exporting or selling domestically final goods. 
This suggests that signing a shallow PTA positively affects demand-seeking MP through lowering the 
costs of importing intermediate inputs and exporting final products to the parties of the PTA. A second 
finding is that deep provisions do not seem to have any impact on MP of goods all across the different 
types of goods and activities of affiliates. The only significant coefficient in the analysis is negative for 
the impact of services, investment and competition provisions on FA producing final products that are 
exported. The core tariff provisions are maybe more important for manufacturing affiliates despite the 
important use of services inputs in the value chain. 
Table 5. PTA effects on MP of goods: further results 
 
Note: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014, and 
use partner-time, host-time and country-pair fixed effects. Column “DEEP” accounts for the effect of deep 
provisions. Standard errors are clustered by country-pair and are reported in parentheses. The p-values read as 
follow: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ENDG DEEP ENDG DEEP ENDG DEEP ENDG DEEP
VARIABLES FA dom int FA dom int FA dom fin FA dom fin FA exp int FA exp int FA exp fin FA exp fin
PTA 0.206 0.213* 0.331*** 0.485*** 0.155** 0.179* 0.198*** 0.317**
(0.126) (0.125) (0.119) (0.168) (0.0732) (0.102) (0.0609) (0.127)
Srv&Cmp&Inv -0.116 -0.268 0.0171 -0.260*
(0.184) (0.219) (0.156) (0.140)
Proc prov 0.224 0.214 -0.0688 0.0108
(0.143) (0.153) (0.118) (0.109)
IPR prov -0.0193 -0.0252 -0.00935 0.144
(0.138) (0.169) (0.122) (0.107)
BIT -0.122 -0.124 -0.355* -0.358* -0.128 -0.127 -0.175 -0.177
(0.126) (0.124) (0.211) (0.209) (0.105) (0.105) (0.133) (0.131)
Observations 13,112 13,112 13,104 13,104 13,112 13,112 13,112 13,112
R-squared 0.984 0.985 0.980 0.980 0.975 0.975 0.977 0.977
Host-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Partner-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-pair YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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Finally, we assess the importance of deep provisions for FA participation in global value chains, by 
focusing on the ‘foreign value added’ (FVA) component of FA domestic output and exports. This means 
that we decompose the output or exports of foreign affiliates and look at the origin of value-added, 
identifying whether it is domestic or foreign. The dependent variable is then only the foreign value-
added which is embodied in the foreign intermediate inputs used by the foreign affiliates. Table 6 shows 
that shallow PTAs have a positive and significant impact on the FVA components of FA activity. This 
confirms that PTAs help foreign affiliates importing intermediate inputs to serve their domestic and 
export markets.  
Table 6. PTA effects on the foreign value-added in the output of foreign affiliates 
 
Note: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014, and 
use partner-time, host-time and country-pair fixed effects. Column “DEEP” accounts for the effect of deep 
provisions. Standard errors are clustered by country-pair and are reported in parentheses. The p-values read as 
follow: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
4.3 Deep integration and MP of services 
So far, we have only looked at the impact of MP on FA operating in the manufacturing sector. We now 
turn to the impact of deep and shallow integration on MP of services. Table 7 includes similar 
specifications to the ones provided in Table 4 but this time the dependent variable is the output of 
services FAs. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ENDG DEEP ENDG DEEP
VARIABLES FVA in FA dom FVA in FA dom FVA in FA exp FVA in FA exp
PTA 0.252** 0.377*** 0.167** 0.248**
(0.112) (0.140) (0.0674) (0.110)
Srv&Cmp&Inv -0.232 -0.103
(0.184) (0.128)
Proc prov 0.0922 -0.140
(0.137) (0.103)
IPR prov 0.0567 0.110
(0.144) (0.103)
BIT -0.165 -0.172 -0.152* -0.151*
(0.127) (0.127) (0.0887) (0.0897)
Observations 13,112 13,112 13,112 13,112
R-squared 0.971 0.971 0.973 0.973
Host-year FE YES YES YES YES
Partner-year FE YES YES YES YES
Country-pair YES YES YES YES
Preferential Trade Agreements and Multinational Production 
European University Institute 11 
Table 7. PTA effects on MP of services 
 
Note: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014, and 
use partner-time and host-time fixed effects. Column (1) applies the OLS estimator and column (2) uses the 
PPML estimator. Column (3) adds country-pair fixed effects. Column (4) introduces PTA lead. Column (5) 
allows for phasing-in effects of PTAs. Column (6) accounts for the effect of deep agreements. Finally, column 
(7) includes an interaction between deep agreements and a dummy for EU members. Standard errors are 
clustered by country-pair and are reported in parentheses. The p-values read as follow: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
Table 7 indicates that for MP of services, there is also a positive effect of shallow trade agreements. But 
in contrast to the results for manufacturing affiliates, there is now a significant negative coefficient for 
the effect of services, investment and competition provisions. To better understand this result, we deepen 
our analysis in two ways. First, we introduce lagged variables for the deep integration provisions to test 
whether the impact depends on the time at which we are trying to observe it. Second, we investigate the 
heterogeneous effect of deep agreements by type of provision. 
Table 8 is based on the specification used in column (7) of Table 7. The most interesting finding is 
that the coefficients for the deep integration variables become positive and significant when the variables 
are lagged by two years. This implies that it takes two years for deep agreements to increase MP of 
services, which is consistent with the evidence that reforms of behind-the-border measures take time to 
be implemented (Mattoo, Mulabdic and Ruta, 2017). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS PPML ENDG LEAD PHSNG EU DEEP
VARIABLES FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output
Contiguity 0.834*** 0.206***
(0.172) (0.0534)
Common language 0.344** 0.382***
(0.158) (0.0531)
Log distance -0.927*** -0.386***
(0.0782) (0.0320)
Colony 0.556*** 0.213***
(0.187) (0.0488)
PTA -0.279** 0.0938 0.166** 0.150* 0.0970 0.169** 0.238*
(0.129) (0.0605) (0.0780) (0.0769) (0.0904) (0.0788) (0.129)
BIT -0.177** -0.0675 0.195 0.193 0.202 0.195 0.194
(0.0886) (0.0574) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.171) (0.174)
PTA(t+2) 0.0356
(0.0512)
PTA(t-2) 0.112
(0.0777)
PTA*EU -0.279
(0.416)
Srv&Cmp&Inv -0.314*
(0.169)
Proc prov 0.101
(0.165)
IPR prov 0.142
(0.155)
Observations 12,439 13,120 13,080 13,080 13,080 13,080 13,080
R-squared 0.706 0.878 0.972 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.973
Host-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Partner-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-pair FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
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This result is observed for the Srv&Cmp&Inv variable but also when introducing separately dummy 
variables for the three types of provisions: services, investment and competition. Investment provisions 
are those driving the negative and significant coefficient for the current year deep integration dummy. 
Maybe because of the possible substitution between trade and investment, investment provisions are 
first having a negative impact on MP of services with firms being able to export rather than producing 
through foreign affiliates. But then there could be a positive impact once firms have had sufficient time 
to establish and start to produce due to the investment liberalisation.  
The fact that we observe positive and significant coefficients (with a lag) for MP of services and not 
for goods is consistent with the fact that many of the barriers to foreign investment and FA activity, such 
as foreign equity limits, discriminatory licensing conditions applying to foreign investors or the non-
recognition of qualifications earned abroad, are found in services sectors. 
In addition, while services, investment and competition provisions have a positive impact on MP of 
services after two years, the effect of ‘shallow’ agreements loses significance and magnitude in the 
specifications with only services and competition dummies.  
Table 8. PTA effects on MP of services: further results 
 
Note: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014, and 
use partner-time, host-time and country-pair fixed effects. Column “DEEP” accounts for the effect of deep 
provisions. Standard errors are clustered by country-pair and are reported in parentheses. The p-values read as 
follow: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ENDG ENDG DEEP DEEP DEEP DEEP DEEP DEEP
VARIABLES FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output
PTA 0.329** 0.325** 0.0274 0.0149 -0.0734 -0.0936 0.328** 0.323**
(0.142) (0.140) (0.0928) (0.0957) (0.217) (0.215) (0.142) (0.140)
Srv&Cmp&Inv -0.204 -0.310*
(0.167) (0.182)
Srv&Cmp&Inv(t-2) 0.172**
(0.0716)
BIT 0.194 0.203 0.194 0.202 0.188 0.193 0.194 0.203
(0.176) (0.173) (0.168) (0.165) (0.165) (0.162) (0.176) (0.173)
Serv prov 0.175* 0.0816
(0.103) (0.106)
Serv prov(t-2) 0.172***
(0.0649)
Comp prov 0.262 0.193
(0.237) (0.241)
Comp prov(t-2) 0.139**
(0.0642)
Invest prov -0.202 -0.308*
(0.166) (0.182)
Inv prov(t-2) 0.172**
(0.0716)
Observations 13,080 13,080 13,080 13,080 13,080 13,080 13,080 13,080
R-squared 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.973 0.972 0.973
Host-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Partner-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-pair YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
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5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has investigated the impact of deep integration provisions in PTAs on MP of goods and 
services. The results suggest that unlike what is observed for (cross-border) trade, deep integration PTAs 
have mixed effects on the output of foreign affiliates. On the one hand, we find that shallow integration 
(or tariff liberation) has a positive impact on MP of goods with no additional effects from deep 
integration provisions. On the other hand, we find that deep integration provisions impact MP of 
services, but with a lag. 
These results are not surprising since trade and investment are in a complex relationship, sometimes 
acting as substitutes and sometimes being complements. Also, firms create foreign affiliates for different 
purposes, not all of which can benefit from deep integration provisions. 
Therefore, the analysis of the impact of PTA provisions on MP may have to depart from the 
shallow/deep integration dichotomy introduced for the trade impact of PTAs. While it makes sense to 
refer to a shallow and deep integration when only the latter has a positive and significant impact on 
trade, new categories will have to emerge to describe the types of provisions that benefit MP, especially 
if what is ‘shallow’ has more of an impact than what is ‘deep’. 
An area where our results are however promising and can lead to further research is that the value-
added decomposition of the output of foreign affiliates can help to identify where the trade provisions 
of PTAs matter and to distinguish different types of motives for MP. Further analysis could investigate 
how different types of sourcing strategies and participation in international production networks are 
impacted by PTA provisions. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. 4-year intervals: MP of goods 
 
Note: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012, and use partner-time and 
host-time fixed effects. Column (1) applies the OLS estimator and column (2) uses the PPML estimator. Column 
(3) adds country-pair fixed effects. Column (4) introduces PTA lead. Column (5) allows for phasing-in effects of 
PTAs. Column (6) accounts for the effect of deep provisions. Finally, column (7) includes an interaction between 
deep agreements and a dummy for EU Member countries. Standard errors are clustered by country-pair and are 
reported in parentheses. The p-values read as follow: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS PPML ENDG LEAD PHSNG EU DEEP
VARIABLES FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output
Contiguity 0.895*** 0.0968
(0.166) (0.0875)
Common language 0.235* 0.439***
(0.141) (0.0928)
Log distance -0.882*** -0.556***
(0.0646) (0.0541)
Colony 0.383** 0.173**
(0.173) (0.0793)
PTA -0.205** -0.148 0.163* 0.168* 0.177** 0.161* 0.125
(0.0988) (0.119) (0.0944) (0.0932) (0.0895) (0.0950) (0.131)
BIT -0.0287 0.156 -0.205* -0.200* -0.203* -0.205* -0.204*
(0.0748) (0.106) (0.122) (0.118) (0.120) (0.122) (0.122)
RTA(t+4) 0.0852*
(0.0495)
RTA(t-4) -0.0910
(0.0790)
RTA*EU 0.327
(0.369)
Srv&Cmp&Inv 0.0604
(0.175)
Proc prov 0.0733
(0.121)
IPR prov -0.0857
(0.150)
Observations 6,063 6,560 6,552 6,552 6,552 6,552 6,552
R-squared 0.802 0.833 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985
Host-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Partner-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-pair FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
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Table A2. 4-year intervals: MP of services 
 
Note: All estimates are obtained with data for the years 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012, and use partner-time and 
host-time fixed effects. Column (1) applies the OLS estimator and column (2) uses the PPML estimator. Column 
(3) adds country-pair fixed effects. Column (4) introduces PTA lead. Column (5) allows for phasing-in effects of 
PTAs. Column (6) accounts for the effect of deep provisions. Finally, column (7) includes an interaction between 
deep agreements and a dummy for EU Member countries. Standard errors are clustered by country-pair and are 
reported in parentheses. The p-values read as follow: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OLS PPML ENDG LEAD PHSNG EU DEEP
VARIABLES FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output FA output
Contiguity 0.840*** 0.207***
(0.170) (0.0767)
Common language 0.340** 0.351***
(0.160) (0.0755)
Log distance -0.909*** -0.392***
(0.0801) (0.0454)
Colony 0.605*** 0.262***
(0.186) (0.0690)
PTA -0.285** 0.108 0.184* 0.185* 0.154 0.194* 0.210
(0.138) (0.0910) (0.101) (0.100) (0.109) (0.103) (0.183)
BIT -0.224** -0.0645 0.257 0.256 0.268 0.256 0.261
(0.0933) (0.0804) (0.201) (0.201) (0.200) (0.202) (0.204)
RTA(t+4) 0.0103
(0.0618)
RTA(t-4) 0.139
(0.0890)
RTA*EU -0.704
(0.490)
Srv&Cmp&Inv -0.313
(0.243)
Proc prov 0.295
(0.229)
IPR prov 0.0379
(0.230)
Observations 6,219 6,560 6,536 6,536 6,536 6,536 6,536
R-squared 0.698 0.880 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974 0.974
Host-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Partner-year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Country-pair FE NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
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